AN APPRAISAL OF BANKS COMPLIANCE WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES IN NIGERIA
Abstract
Regulatory institutions in Nigeria continues to redirect the affairs of the economic units operating in the financial sector towards desired growth and sustainability. Yet, ample empirical evidence is lacking on the extent of compliance with the provisions and principles of the different Codes of Corporate Governance established, especially for listed banks in Nigeria. Thus, this study closed this gap by providing empirical evaluation of the extent to which listed banks comply with the provisions and principles of corporate governance codes in Nigeriausing data from 12 deposit money banks listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) over 13 years period of 2011 to 2023.The data was analyses using inferential and descriptive approaches.
The research found that the level of compliance of the banks to provisions and principles of the different codes of corporate governance was very high. However, not all the banks fully acted in line with the codes and regulations, especially in the aspect of board diversity. It is therefore not unexpected that the discrepancy in the level of compliance of each bank to each corporate governance mechanism is likely to have occurred and with their different impact on sustainability and the financial performances of the respective bank during the period under consideration. It can also be deduced that the board diversity is not likely to have as much significant influence relative to other corporate governance mechanisms such as board size, board independence, and board diligence.
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